PRIMAKOV DOCTRINE AND RUSSIAN GEOPOLITICS OF MULTIPOLARITY

PRIMAKOV DOCTRINE AND RUSSIAN GEOPOLITICS OF MULTIPOLARITY
Irnerio Seminatore

Table of Contents
Agreements and disagreements in the American-Russian vision of History
Primakov as seen by Kissinger
United States – Russia: two conceptions of History
United States – Russia: a common destiny?
New types of danger and limited rivalry
On the logic of interests in the Soviet era
Primakov and active foreign policy
Impossible idealization or workable model?
Readings of multipolarity as seen from Moscow

Agreements and disagreements in the American-Russian vision of History

One of the best introductions to the “Primakov doctrine” is to be found in the philosophical questions that Henry Kissinger addressed to the then Foreign Minister in the Chernomyrdin government, Yevgeny Primakov, and especially in his replies, published in 1998 in the journal of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, International Life (“Международная жизнь”). In the informal discussions that alternately brought together in Washington and Moscow, after the disappearance of the Soviet Union, two delegations of personalities from both countries who had held high responsibilities, the essential aim was the search for reciprocal understanding and the establishment of a dialogue dedicated to improving bilateral relations and to consultation on the balance of the world to come. In America this group was presented as a Track II, that is, bipartisan and encouraged by the White House to reflect, but not to negotiate on its behalf.

President Putin received this group in Moscow in 2007 and President Medvedev in 2009. In 2008 President George W. Bush gathered most of his national security team for a dialogue with the aforementioned guests. Such is the importance of these meetings.

The effort at dialogue, in a multipolar world in the making, was to be seen as an essential element of any global equilibrium in which Russia would no longer be perceived as a threat to the United States.

It was a matter of smoothing out the roughnesses that hindered American-Russian relations and of reflecting on the possibilities of cooperative approaches. On the other hand, this dialogue was interrupted and the logic of confrontation took precedence over the will to cooperate. Nevertheless, despite the changes that have occurred since the 1990s, the questions posed at the time remain valid. “What have been the trends that called into question the order of yesterday and that shape that of today? What are the challenges posed to the interests of Russia and America? What role does each country wish to play in the construction of this order and what importance can it reasonably hope to have in it?”

“Today, after the Cold War, Russia, like other countries, it was said at the time, has the right to guarantee its security, its stability and the integrity of its territory? What country can be prevented from making economic and social progress, from fighting against external influences that may seek to divide its society and those of the ‘Community of Independent States’ (former members of the USSR)?”

In Russia the “multipolar world” remains an essential concept of the “Primakov doctrine,” and this has been pursued by Lavrov and adopted by Putin. The current ideological affinities (2026) between Washington and Moscow, the Kremlin’s nostalgia for the American-Soviet duopoly and the long-standing attraction felt by Donald Trump toward Russia in no way guarantee smooth cooperation between the two capitals. Ukraine remains to this day an obstacle to this rapprochement, and the attitude of the principal European countries toward Russia can be defined as hostile, both in the short term and in a longer-term perspective.

The analyses and difficulties evoked seem to characterize the unresolved knots of current international politics and deserve to be taken up almost integrally before turning to their official interpretations by the leaders in charge, in this case Russian ones (see Putin, in the conclusion of the XXIInd Valdai Forum of 2 October 2025 in Sochi, or at the Saint Petersburg International Economic Forum of 3–6 June 2026, where the Russian President reproached the European elites for using Ukraine as “a card” in a geopolitical game that exceeds it, in order to enlarge their zone of influence and to militarize the continent).

In the order of Kissinger’s exposition, forming part of the Euro-Russian dialogue of the 1990s, we find the reference to shared realities during the encounters with the Russians and, at the same time, value judgments on men or situations.

Primakov as seen by Kissinger

Kissinger says in his account:

“The world was traversed by crises to which the difference of cultures and the antagonism of ideologies brought a certain grandeur. In this work Yevgeny Primakov was an indispensable partner. His sharp and analytical mind, enhanced by a global understanding of the trends of our time, acquired during years spent close to power and then at its center, and also his great devotion to his country, made it possible to refine our common thinking and to contribute to the quest for a shared vision. We were not always in agreement, but we always had respect for one another.” That was the only way to make progress! Can the same tone and the same appreciation be found today on the part of Western Europeans toward the Kremlin? Facing the “multipolar world,” an essential element of the “Primakov doctrine,” there appeared a flexible and dynamic aspect that the Putinian version has rendered rigid and founded on military power relations, the return to spheres of influence and the criticism of Europeans. The submission of the latter to the globalist and unilateralist “monologue” of the Western media, whose key points are abundantly known, forbids any reciprocal cooperation. Indeed the Europeans are said to be animated by the will to seek a way out of their difficulties by making Russia the “figure of the enemy.”

United States – Russia: two conceptions of History

“The most important problem was – according to Kissinger – the abyssal gulf that separated two conceptions of history. For the United States the end of the Cold War reinforced their profound belief in the inevitability of the democratic revolution. It prefigured the extension of an international system principally governed by the rules of law. But the Russian historical experience has been different and more complex. For a country whose territory has known military invasions for centuries, coming from East or West, security must rest, certainly on legal bases, but above all on geopolitics. Once the frontier, the security rampart, has been displaced 1,000 km from the Elbe in the direction of Moscow, the Russian perception of the world order cannot do without a strategic dimension. The challenge of our time consists in grasping these two visions – the legalist and the geopolitical – in a coherent concept.”

This challenge – Kissinger continues – referred reflection back to an essentially philosophical problem. “How can the United States get along with Russia, which does not share its values at all, but which is an unavoidable element of the international order?” How can Russia guarantee its security without alarming its neighbors and making enemies for itself? Can Russia obtain a place in world affairs without that disturbing the United States? Many thought that America would succeed in getting these choices accepted by forming strategic alliances with the former enemies of the Cold War, who would agree to play a secondary role. The Secretaries of State and former deputies to the American President wished that, in the Moscow/Washington relationship, Washington would dominate. Thus in 1994 Zbigniew Brzezinski, more explicit, declared: “Henceforth it is impossible to collaborate with Russia. An ally is a country ready to act truly with us, and that in a responsible manner. Russia is not an ally. It is a client.”

United States – Russia: a common destiny?

“Many on both sides understood that the destinies of Russia and the United States could not be separated. Preserving stability and preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction became more necessary every day, as did the building of a security system in Eurasia, notably all around the Russian borders.” “All this meant that at the end of the Cold War the USSR had ceased to be a ‘superpower.’ In fact the new situation meant that there now existed only one superpower.

However, it was also necessary to understand that the very concept of ‘superpower’ was inherited from the Cold War. No one could contest the fact that the United States was then the foremost military, economic and financial power. But that State could not control and direct the others. Such an approach ignores the great transformation constituted by the transition from a bipolar conflictual world to a multipolar world.” “If Russia wishes to remain one of the principal powers, it must act on all planes. Account must be taken of the United States, Europe, China, Japan, India, the countries of the Middle East, Asia, Oceania, South America and Africa.”

“In the meantime the end of the war considerably weakened the links that united most of the countries of the world to one or other of the two superpowers. The end of the Warsaw Pact distanced the countries of Central and Eastern Europe from Russia. This was even more flagrant with the former members of the USSR that had become independent. The United States also saw former allies move away, but in a less obvious manner.” “It is significant in this regard to note – Kissinger continues – that the countries that were not directly engaged in the confrontation of the two blocs displayed, at the end of the ‘Cold War,’ greater autonomy. Such a finding applies above all to China, which rapidly became a great economic power, as well as to the new integration unions in Asia, Oceania and South America.”

“The collapse of the USSR created the illusion of an ideal world founded solely on the principles of democracy. One may see here, too, a reference to Carl Schmitt and to his analysis of the jus publicum europaeum which, the German jurist explained, made it possible to limit war, a period that came to an end with the First World War.”

New types of danger and limited rivalry

“Now we are confronted with a new type of danger. Until very recently the endangering of the international order went hand in hand with the accumulation of power by a dominant State. Today the threats arise rather from the failure of state structures and from the growing number of States without leaders. The problem of the failure of power, which is spreading more and more, cannot be solved by one State, however large, in an exclusively national perspective. It requires continuous cooperation between the United States, Russia and the other powers. Consequently the rivalry between countries that is the object of the resolution of traditional conflicts, in an interstate system, must be limited so that this rivalry does not exceed bounds and create a precedent.”

On the logic of interests in the Soviet era

“Of course relations with the West and especially with the United States have always been of great importance – Prokhanov replied – But our country must not forget its own interests and follow the historical change toward a multipolar world. It is necessary to preserve our values and our traditions, acquired throughout Russian history, including during the imperial and Soviet periods.”

“There exists a very ancient rule: enemies are not permanent while national interests are. This idea guided and still guides today the foreign policy of most countries of the world. On the other hand, in the Soviet era we forgot this maxim and national interests were sometimes sacrificed to the support of ‘permanent friends’ and to the struggle against ‘permanent enemies.’ Now if the existence of common interests is neglected, a new Cold War will probably take place.” Kissinger, conscious of the conditioning between domestic policy and foreign policy, specifies, addressing his compatriots: “some believe that Russia cannot manage a voluntarist foreign policy. According to them it must occupy itself with internal affairs, strengthen the economy, carry out a military reform and then return to the international stage with considerable weight. But this point of view does not stand up to analysis.

Above all it will be difficult for Russia to realize these crucial changes and to retain a footing of equality. Answering this question is also a question of foreign policy. Past the period of confrontations, it is nevertheless still important for Russia to guarantee security and stability, inside its borders but also in the neighbouring regions. These feelings were exacerbated by the memory of the first post-Soviet decade, during which Russia was going through an incredible economic and political crisis while the United States rejoiced in continuous economic growth of unprecedented duration. All this fueled political divergences on subjects such as the Balkans, the former Soviet territories, the Middle East, the expansion of NATO, ballistic defense and arms sales, so that projects of cooperation were swallowed up in them.”

Primakov and active foreign policy

“If Russia abandons active foreign policy it is not possible for it to keep a possibility of returning to the world stage as a powerful country. International relations abhor a vacuum. If a country disengages from world processes it will rapidly be replaced. If Russia wishes to remain one of the principal powers it must act on all planes. Account must be taken of the United States, Europe, China, Japan, India, the countries of the Middle East, Asia, Oceania, South America and Africa.

“Are we capable of it? Of course it is difficult to succeed on all fronts with our limited resources. But we can conduct an active foreign policy thanks to our political influence, our geographical situation, our membership of the nuclear club, our status as permanent member of the UN Security Council, our scientific tradition, our economic capacities and our advanced military industry.”

Impossible idealization or workable model?

Thus the considerations on the difficult current transition, expressed by the two leading figures of Cold War diplomacy, Kissinger and Primakov, well illustrate the method of a dialogue indispensable to the concerted resolution of the outcomes practicable in the regions of attrition between the United States and Russia. In trying to adapt the historical analogy to a profoundly metamorphosed international atmosphere, we shall conclude that the essence of the American-Soviet understanding rested on dialogue and mutual understanding.

Readings of multipolarity as seen from Moscow

“The reading of the international context and of the promotion of a multipolar world, as seen today from Russia, comprises three dominant themes: the Trumpian revolution and its foundations, the return to the ‘Monroe Doctrine’ opposed to Wilsonianism, the analogy between the Schmittian conception of ‘great spaces’ and of ‘Civilization-States’ adopted by the ideologues of ‘Greater Russia’ and the Maga project (Make America Great Again), involving an assumed adoption of power. In the historical perspective one will note that the international system is to be apprehended in terms of stability rather than in terms of order; for the concept of stability is linked to the observable state of the world ‘balance,’ while that of order derives from a legalist and contestable vision of interstate relations.

As regards Trump’s America, it is considered in Moscow that the specificity of the different States in cultural and civilizational matters plays a growing role in the promotion of a multipolar world whose aim is to ensure independence and autarky. Thus the model of international relations of our epoch would be that of great powers and not of medium powers, which imposes a redistribution of spaces and resources. In the Trumpian claims of annexation of Canada, Greenland and Panama one sees the entry into ‘the era of a new national-populism, seated on the bases of a classical expansionism’ and this expansionism is clearly distinguished from economic and financial influence as well as from the policy of interference under humanitarian packaging. As for the return of the ‘Monroe Doctrine,’ the preoccupation of the United States with avoiding a confrontation with Russia and China, to the profit of the Maga project, has been well received in Moscow, where, when Trump speaks of America, one perceives that he is speaking of the American continent or of the two hemispheres, North and South. This means, according to certain Russian political scientists, that Moscow is legitimated to defend its interests in its backyard and to maintain or even extend its sphere of influence in Eurasia. Moreover, despite the refusal of a part of the American elites to recognize for Russia a sphere of influence so vast, others refer to the Arctic where a Russo-American condominium could be exercised by the safeguarding of the exclusive interests of the two countries.

It is estimated that this collaboration could take the form of a ‘bilateral Monroe Doctrine,’ by a sort of extension of the common vision of the present international system. Following this reading it would not be forbidden to envisage a new partition of the world into spheres of influence on the model of a ‘new Yalta.’ Dream of intellectuals (A. Dugin), distant both from the ‘Primakov Doctrine’ and from the Soviet victory in the Second World War.

Returning to the slogan of a world governed ‘by rules,’ the political realism adopted in Moscow invites reflection on their restricted validity because every sort of world order is the product of secular conflicts and, in particular, of the rules imposed by the dominant power.

As for the doctrine of the limitation of war, also evoked by Westerners, this limitation refers to a set of philosophical, ethical and juridical concepts that frame the right to resort to force and restrict violence during armed conflicts, as opposed to the concept of ‘absolute war’ or ‘total’ war, by definition without rules. It is pointed out that this limitation was conceived at a time when nuclear deterrence was supposed to thwart conventional conflicts and at the heart of which the use of the atom was the object of a prohibition and its calling into question a taboo. Now the new element, Russian specialists note, is represented by the possibility of a tactical employment of the nuclear weapon. A fundamental obstacle to rapprochement between Washington and Moscow remains the Ukrainian problem on which the chancelleries of the European countries stumble and, in a particularly virulent manner, Paris and London. It is in this case a matter of an interpretation as strict as it is hypocritical of the concept of aggression, defined by the United Nations Charter (Art. 2/4), and several times transgressed by the Western powers, which acted without a UN mandate (Kosovo – 1999, Iraq – 2003, Syria – from 2014).

Thus, in the constitution of a Coalition of the Willing, what is the foundation of legitimacy in a co-belligerence of London and Paris in support of Zelensky’s initiatives to strike in depth the territory of the Russian Federation? Does this indirect intervention of Great Britain and France not open, as President Putin has declared, a ‘Pandora’s box,’ with unforeseeable consequences? At the historical level, Macron and Burnham, going well beyond a Peaceful Engagement in the Brzezinski manner, far exceed the recommendations of containment in the Kennan manner and the logic of hegemonic pluralism formulated by the National Security Adviser to President Carter in the 1980s. The response of these two countries to Russian Eurasianism and further to the present multipolarity of the Kremlin is the inverse of the ‘Primakov Doctrine,’ conceived at a time when Europe counted on a close partnership with America.

The whole risk of seeing in the ‘Coalition of the Willing’ the sketch of an autonomous European strategy is confirmed in the increase of tensions between Berlin and Moscow, concerning the accusation addressed by Germany to the Kremlin of being responsible for a drone attack against Leipzig airport, a strategic site for NATO and support to Ukraine. An episode that makes one fear a new escalation between Russia and NATO and that recalls a major event of Euro-Russian relations, the sabotage operation of the Nord Stream 1 and 2 pipelines of 26 September 2022, ordered, according to the German federal justice system, by the Ukrainian authorities.